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  In mobile ad hoc network (MANET), secure communication is more challenging task due to its 
fundamental characteristics like having less infrastructure, wireless link, distributed 
cooperation, dynamic topology, lack of association, resource constrained and physical 
vulnerability of node. In MANET, attacks can be broadly classified in two categories: routing 
attacks and data forwarding attacks. Any action not following rules of routing protocols belongs 
to routing attacks. The main objective of routing attacks is to disrupt normal functioning of 
network by advertising false routing updates. On the other hand, data forwarding attacks 
include actions such as modification or dropping data packet, which does not disrupt routing 
protocol. In this paper, we address the “Packet Drop Attack”, which is a serious threat to 
operational mobile ad hoc networks. The consequence of not forwarding other packets or 
dropping other packets prevents any kind of communication to be established in the network. 
Therefore, there is a need to address the packet dropping event takes higher priority for the 
mobile ad hoc networks to emerge and to operate, successfully. In this paper, we propose a 
method to secure ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) routing protocol. The proposed 
method provides security for routing packets where the malicious node acts as a black-hole and 
drops packets. In this method, the collaboration of a group of nodes is used to make accurate 
decisions. Validating received RREPs allows the source to select trusted path to its destination. 
The simulation results show that the proposed mechanism is able to detect any number of 
attackers.        
© 2012 Growing Science Ltd.  All rights reserved.
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1.  Introduction 
 
A Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is an autonomous system of wireless mobile nodes, which can 
be dynamically setup anywhere and anytime. MANET differs from cellular networks or conventional 
wired networks as there is no centralized access point (Hu & Perrig, 2004; Murthy & Manoj, 2004). 
MANET allows multi-hop communication among nodes, which are not in direct transmission range 
through intermediate nodes. Nodes are free to move randomly thus form arbitrary network topology.   2272
The network size changes as a node can join or leave network at any time. The main problem in 
mobile ad hoc networks is the lack of consistency to deliver information to the intended node so, 
MANET is more vulnerable to security attacks than conventional wired and wireless networks due to 
its fundamental characteristics of open medium, dynamic topology, absence of centralized access 
point, distributed cooperation, lack of association (Yang et al., 2004). Authorized and malicious 
nodes both can access the wireless channel. As a result, there is no clear line of security in MANETs 
from the outside world. Routing algorithm needs mutual trust between nodes and absence of 
centralized access point prevents use of monitoring agent in the system. The limitation of wireless 
network and mobile nodes such as bandwidth of wireless channel, frequent disconnection of link, 
partition of network, short battery lifetime and limited computation capability poses an important 
challenge for implementation of cryptographic algorithms for providing security to these networks. 
Routing security is an important issue in MANET. In MANET, two types of messages are used: data 
messages and routing or control messages. Data messages need end to end authentication and can be 
secured using point to point security mechanism. Routing messages are used for the route 
establishment and route maintenance. Routing messages are processed by intermediate nodes during 
their propagation therefore securing routing messages is more challenging compared with data 
messages. A malicious node can perform many types of routing attacks such as routing table 
overflow, routing table and cache poisoning. Routing protocols must be robust against routing attack 
in order to establish correct and efficient route between pair of nodes. In this paper, we address the 
“Packet Drop Attack”, which is a serious threat to operational mobile ad  hoc networks. Although the 
proposed method is focused on AODV protocol, the proposed solution is applicable to other routing 
protocols for MANETs. 
2. Security attacks and related work 
The security attacks in mobile ad hoc network fall into two categories: passive attacks and active 
attacks. In passive attack, malicious node does not affect the normal operation of data so it is very 
difficult to detect. It includes traffic analysis, monitoring and eavesdropping. Encryption algorithms 
are used to prevent passive attacks. In active attack, malicious node disrupts the normal functioning 
of system by performing either external or internal attacks. External attacks are from malicious nodes, 
which would not belong to network. External attacks can be prevented by using cryptography 
techniques such as encryption. Internal attacks are from either compromised or hijacked nodes, which 
attempt to disrupt the normal routing function in order to consume the network resources. Internal 
attacks include modification, impersonation, jamming, sleep deprivation and denial of service attacks, 
which are very difficult to prevent. 
There have been many studies for security of routing in MANET. Hu et al. (2002b) proposed secure 
efficient ad hoc distance vector (SEAD) and used a protocol, which is based on the design of DSDV 
(Perkins & Bhagwat, 1994). SEAD is designed to prevent attacks such as DoS and resource 
consumption attacks. SEAD uses one way hash function for authenticating the updates, which are 
received from malicious nodes and non-malicious nodes and it can be used by any suitable 
authentication and key distribution scheme. However, finding such a scheme is not straightforward. 
Ariadne (Hu et al., 2002a), by the same authors, is based on basic operation of DSR (Johnson & 
Maltz, 1996). Ariadne is a secure on-demand routing protocol and uses only high efficient symmetric 
cryptographic operations. Ariadne provides security against one compromised node and prevents 
many types of denial-of-service attacks. Ariadne uses message authentication code (MAC) and secret 
key shared between two parties to ensures point-to-point authentication of a routing message. 
However, it relies on the TESLA (Perrig et al., 2001) broadcast authentication protocol for secure 
authentication of a routing message, which requires loose clock synchronization which is, arguably, 
an unrealistic requirement for ad hoc networks. It is quite likely that, for a small team of nodes that 
trust each other and that want to create an ad hoc network where the messages are only routed by 
members of the teams, the simplest way to keep secret communications is to encrypt all messages 
(routing and data) with a “team key”. Every member of the team would know the key and, therefore, Z. Alishahi et al./ Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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it is possible to encrypt and to decrypt every single packet. Nevertheless, this does not scale well and 
the members of the team have to trust each other. So it can be only used for a very small subset of the 
possible scenarios. Security-aware routing (SAR) (Kravets et al., 2001) is an on demand routing 
protocol based on AODV (Perkins & Royer, 1999). SAR defines level of trust as a metric for routing. 
Nodes distribute key with those nodes having equal level of trust or higher level of trust. Thus an 
encrypted packet can be decrypted only by the nodes of the same or higher levels of trust. The main 
drawback of SAR is that during the path discovery process, encryption and decryption is done at each 
hop, which increases the power consumption. The protocol also requires different keys for various 
level of security, which leads to increase in number of keys required when the number of security 
levels used increases. 
Sanzgiri et al. (2002) proposed ARAN, authenticated routing for ad hoc networks (ARAN), which is 
based on AODV that uses authentication and requires the use of a trusted certificate server whose 
public key is known to all legal nodes in the network. In ARAN, every node, which forwards a route 
discovery or a route reply message must also sign it. This is very time consuming and causes the size 
of the routing messages to increase at each hop. On the other hand, the ARAN uses asymmetric 
cryptography, which causes higher cost for route discovery. The ARAN ensures secure route by end-
to-end route authentication process but needs a small amount of prior security coordination among 
nodes. The ARAN prevents unauthorized participation, message modification attacks but prone to 
replay attacks if nodes do not have time synchronization. Papadimitratos and Haas (2002) proposed a 
protocol (SRP), which can be applied to several existing routing protocols (in particular DSR see 
Johnson et al., 2003 and for IERP see Haas et al., 2002). SRP requires that, for every route discovery, 
source and destination must have a common security association. Furthermore, the paper does not 
even mention route error messages. Therefore, they are not protected, and any malicious node can 
just forge error messages with other nodes as source. Zapata and Asokan (2003) proposed Secure 
AODV (SAODV), another protocol designed to secure AODV. The idea behind SAODV is to use a 
digital signature to authenticate the non-mutable fields of messages and hash chains to secure the hop 
count information. The SAODV described two methods to secure routing: Single Signature Extension 
and Double Signature Extension. When a node receives any message such as RREQ or RREP, it first 
verifies the signature before creating or updating a reverse route to that host. The SAODV is based on 
asymmetric key cryptographic operation therefore the nodes in MANET are unable to verify the 
digital signatures quickly enough as they have limited battery life as well as processing power. 
Moreover, if a malicious node floods messages with invalid signatures then verification can be very 
expensive. 
3. Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV) protocol 
3.1 Overview 
Ad Hoc On-Demand Vector Routing (AODV) protocol (Perkins et al., 2003) is a reactive routing 
protocol for ad hoc and mobile networks, which maintains routes only among nodes, which need to 
communicate. The routing messages do not contain information about the whole route path, but only 
about the source and the destination. Therefore, routing messages do not have an increasing size. It 
uses destination sequence numbers to specify how fresh a route is (in relation to another), which is 
used to grant loop freedom. Whenever a node needs to send a packet to a destination in which it has 
no ‘fresh enough’ route (i.e., a valid route entry for the destination whose associated sequence 
number is at least as great as the ones contained in any RREQ that the node has received for that 
destination) it broadcasts a route request (RREQ) message to its neighbors. Each node, which 
receives the broadcast sets up a reverse route towards the originator of the RREQ, unless it has a 
‘fresher’ one. When the intended destination (or an intermediate node that has a ‘fresh enough’ route 
to the destination) receives the RREQ, it replies by sending a Route Reply (RREP). It is important to 
note that the only mutable information in a RREQ and in a RREP is the hop count, which is being   2274
monotonically increased at each hop. The RREP is uncast back to the originator of the RREQ. At 
each intermediate node, a route to the destination is set (again, unless the node has a ‘fresher’ route 
than the one specified in the RREP). In the case that the RREQ is replied to by an intermediate node 
(and if the RREQ had set this option), the intermediate node also sends a RREP to the destination. In 
this way, it can be granted that the route path is being set up bidirectionally. In the case that a node 
receives a new route (by a RREQ or by a RREP) and the node already has a route ‘as fresh’ as the 
received one, the shortest one will be updated. 
4. Packet Drop Attack 
A packet may be dropped under various reasons, which in turn can be grouped into the following 
categories, 
1) Unsteadiness of the medium, 
  A packet may be dropped due to contention in the medium 
  A packet may be dropped due to congestion and corruption in the medium 
  A packet may be dropped due to broken link 
2) Genuineness of the node, 
  A packet may be dropped due to overflow of the transmission queue 
  A packet may be dropped due to lack of energy resources 
3) Selfishness of the node, 
  A packet may be dropped due to the selfishness of a node to save its resources 
4) Maliciousness of the node, 
  A packet may be dropped due to the malignant act of a malicious node 
The unsteadiness of the medium generally causes errors in the packet, which forces the begin node to 
drop the packet even if the node aspires to forward it. On other hand, a genuine node with zero 
options may drop the packets when it runs out of its resources. Though a packet may be dropped in 
the similar manner by a selfish or a malicious node, they distinctly differ from the others because the 
packets are dropped intentionally. From the above examination, it is obvious that the intentional 
packet drop events have to be tackled, which we generalize as “Packet Drop Attack”. Generally, there 
are two types of attackers: The type-1 attacker drops all the received packets. The type-2 attacker is 
smarter and drops only data packets and exchanges control packets normally. In this paper, we will 
investigate type-2 attackers (Abdalla et al., 2011). 
5. Proposed Method 
We investigate the attacks in which malicious node forward the control packets such as normal node, 
but it discards data packets when receives them. We also address the malicious nodes that drop 
control packets and send fictitious RRAPs to source node. We raise the security in the way that we 
distinguish invalid paths from valid paths and discard invalid paths and just send our data packets 
through valid path. Security mechanism is used both at the time of route discovery and route reply 
process. The proposed model of this paper investigates validity of intermediate node, which forward 
RREQ or RREP packets in each hop. At the time of route discovery process, each intermediate when 
a node receives RREQ or RREP packet, it will identify the node through the packet received. 
Intermediate node performs this operation by sending CM packet (a small data packet) towards the 
previous node and it waits for a reply. The previous node, which has forwarded the RREQ or RREP 
packet is required to acknowledge back to the intermediate node with a ACK packet to verify the 
validity of the path along which the data packets are transmitted as shown in Fig. 1. Z. Alishahi et al./ Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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1  Any intermediate node send CM packet to before node in path 
2  Increment CM counter 
3  If   receiver node is normal node  then 
4       send ACK packet back to intermediate node 
5  Else 
6       drop CM packet and send no ACK packet to source 
7  End if 
8  If   CM counter >3 and intermediate node receive no ACK packet   then   discards RREQ or RREP 
packet 
9  End if 
10  If   CM counter <3 and intermediate node received no ACK packet  then 
11      Send CM packet again  
12     Increment CM counter 
13  End if 
14  If   intermediate node received ACK packet  then 
15      Forward RREQ or RREP packet 
16  End if 
 
Fig. 1. (a)Validate of RREQ /RREP packets at the time of Route Discovery (b)validate algorithm 
If  the previous node i.e. the recipient node of the data packet is a normal node it sends reply (ACK 
packet) for intermediate node. However, if it is a malicious node it drops the data packet and sends no 
reply as shown in Fig. 2. If the ACK packet fails to reach back to the intermediate node, then the 
source node increases the number of times of sending CMs. The operations of validation repeats for 
three times and each time intermediate node waits for a reply. A normal node may be not able to send 
a reply because of ruined of connective link or its sources. In both cases received RREQ or RREP 
packet will be discarded and it is not processed because the method assumes that this packet probably 
has come from a malicious node, which looks to attracts all the packets towards itself by altering the 
routing information and then drops those packets. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Attacker drops CM packet (data packet) 
Each time that an origin node broadcasts a RREQ packet in network for finding a route towards a 
distinguished destination it may receive several RREP from various nodes but the origin node must 
choose only the path for sending the data, which passes from credible nodes so we start this security 
mechanism for the selection of the creditable RREP. As soon as an origin node  receives a RREP 
packet, it sends a CM packet (a small data packet) to the sender of the RREP (destination) through the 
first node where the origin node has received RREP from and waits for a reply. If receiver node of 
data packet is a normal node, it searches its routing table to find the  sender of RREP (destination) 
and next node towards the destination and then sends information about next node towards the 
destination(NNTD) for origin node as a reply(ACK packet). However, if receiver node of data packet 
is a malicious node, it discards the packet and sends no reply. Each time origin node sends CM packet 
to destination through NNTD the operations will be continued till the receiver node will be a 
malicious node, which drops the data packet and stops the operations as shown in Fig. 3. 
Alternatively, it will be at the destination that if it is not a malicious node and it sends intended reply 
for origin node. In case it is malicious node, it drops the data packet, so the origin node itself decides 
that path is creditable or not. Discarding packets have come from malicious node(s) enable the source 
to select another trusted path to their destination.   2276
1  Source node send CM packet to destination  
2  If   receiver node = attacker  then 
3      drop CM packet and send no ACK packet to source 
4  Else 
5      If  receiver node=destination then 
6         Send ACK packet to source 
7     Else 
8        send ACK packet to source with information about next node toward destination(NNTD) 
9       forward CM packet 
10     End if 
11  End if 
12  If  source node received ACK packet   then 
13       Waits for ACK packet from NNTD 
14  Else  
15       attacker is detected and source discard RREP packet 
16  End if 
17  If  source received ACK packet came from destination  then 
18  no attacker is detected and transmit data through the RREP packet 
19  End if 
 
Fig. 3. (a) Validate of RREP packet at the time of Route reply (b)Validate Algorithm 
 
In the proposed security mechanism, we do not isolate malicious node from the network and discard 
only RREQ and RREP packets which have come from malicious node (the paths that pass from 
malicious nodes) because the security in sending data is in priority for us. 
6. Simulation and  comparison 
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 present the proposed CPN model for modified AODV protocol based on the 
implementation of CPN Tools to run the simulation.  
 
Fig. 4. CPN model for validate process at the time of Route Discovery Z. Alishahi et al./ Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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Fig. 5. CPN model for validate process at the time of Route Reply 
 
Table 1 shows the number of packets which broadcasted in network .Table 2 shows the number of 
discarded packets (discarded paths) in modified protocol where the variable parameter is time, 
showing that modified AODV protocol can detect the invalid packets that come from malicious 
nodes. 
Table 1                                                                      Table 2 
Broadcasted Valid/Invalid Packets (RREQ /RREP)      Discarded Packets (RREQ /RREP) 
Total  time  2800  5800 8600 11300 14300 17200   Total  time  2800 5800 8600 11300 14300 17200 
Invalid 
packets 
15  32  46  62  78  93     Invalid   
Packets 
15  32  46  62  78  93 
Valid 
packets 
13  24  40  51 63 78   Discarded   
Packets 
16 35 49 66  83  100 
 
Table 3 
Packets distinguished as valid ones (RREQ /RREP) 
Total time  2800  5800  8600  11300  14300  17200
Typical        AODV     Protocol      28  56  86  113  141  171 
Modified    AODV Protocol   12  21  37  47  58  71 
 
Table 3 shows the number of the packets, which are distinguished as valid packets (valid paths for 
transmit data). The result of simulation shows that from the different RREQ and RREP packets that 
are distributed in network, the valid packets only will be forwarded and all of invalid packets will be 
discarded. Also, by assessment of the receiver RREPs by origin node, only the safe paths for sending 
of the data will be chosen and RREPs that pass from a malicious node or a normal node with a broken 
link or ruined sources will be discarded. Therefore, safe paths for sending of the data is chosen all the 
time and in this way the security to find paths and transmit of data both at the time of route discovery 
and reception route reply will be raised.   2278
 
  
 
Fig. 6.  improvement rate recognition of valid packets 
 
 
Fig.7. Performance improvement at ignore invalid paths 
 
Fig. 8. Performance improvement at select of valid paths for transfer data Z. Alishahi et al./ Management Science Letters 2 (2012) 
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Fig. 6 shows the improvement rate recognition of valid packets. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the 
improvement rate routing security when comparing modified AODV with Typical AODV, indicating 
that improvement become more significant when number of invalid paths increases by attackers. 
7. Conclusions and future works 
We have presented a method based on End-to-End connection for securing the AODV protocol. Our 
method can detect many types of malicious node(s) that drop packet through the path between the 
source and the destination. The collaboration of a group of nodes is used to make accurate decisions. 
Discarding packets have come from malicious node(s) enables the source to select another trusted 
path to its destination. We achieved better performance results when action was taken to detect 
malicious nodes by validation operations.  
The simulation results showed that our method is able to detect any number of attackers and fictitious 
packets.  
Our future work will be focused on how to apply the proposed IDS on other MANET routing 
protocols methods. 
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